

Message Text

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SUBJECT: COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S TATEMENT ON ABM REPLACEMENT
PROCEDURES (SCC-IV-003)

THE FOLLOWING IS COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S STATEMENT
ON ABM REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES GIVEN AT SCC-IV
MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1974:

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL

SEPTEMBER 26, 1974

I

1. MR. COMMISSIONER, AT THIS SECOND MEETING OF THE
FOURTH SESSION OF THE SCC, THE U.S. SIDE WILL SET FORTH
CERTAIN OF OUR VIEWS REGARDING THE WORK OF THE SCC.

2. THE TWO PROTOCOLS ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACE-
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MENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,

FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, INITIALED BY YOU AND ME AT THE FINAL MEETING OF OUR LAST SESSION, AND SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON JULY 3, 1974 BY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, REPRESENT A NOTEWORTHY STEP IN PROMOTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBJECTIVES AND PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL. THESE DOCUMENTS REFLECT THE ABILITY OF THE SCC TO SOLVE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS. IN MY OPINION, OUR SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR RESULTED IN LARGE PART FROM THE DIRECT, FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE MANNER IN WHICH BOTH SIDES APPROACHED THE PROBLEMS WE FACED. IN THE JUDGMENT OF THOSE IN RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE WORK OF THE SCC AND STUDIED THE RESULTS ACHIEVED, THOSE TWO PROTOCOLS ARE A JOB WELL DONE.

3. THERE IS ONE ITEM, WHICH WAS RESOLVED LATE IN OUR LAST SESSION, ON WHICH THE U.S. SIDE WISHES TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE AGREED LANGUAGE. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH III.2 OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON JULY 3, 1974, THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS FORMULATION TO MEAN THAT DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF REPLACED SUBMARINES MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED AT SHIPYARDS WHICH CARRY OUT CONSTRUCTION OR REPAIR OF SUBMARINES, AND WHICH ARE SITUATED ON THE NORTHERN AND PACIFIC COASTS OF THE USSR AND ON THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC COASTS OF THE CONTINENTAL PART OF THE U.S.A. THIS MEANS THAT DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF REPLACED SUBMARINES MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED AT SHIPYARDS WHICH CARRY OUT EITHER CONSTRUCTION OR REPAIRS OF SUBMARINES, AND IS NOT LIMITED TO ONLY THOSE SHIPYARDS WHICH CARRY OUT BOTH CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR EXCHANGES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THIS PARAGRAPH, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS THE SAME UNDERSTANDING ON THIS PARAPHRASE.

II

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4. MR. COMMISSIONER, WE HAVE AGREED THAT AT THIS FOURTH SESSION OF THE SCC, WE WILL DISCUSS GENERAL APPROACHES TO WORKING OUT PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT OF OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS AS CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY. IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS DISCUSSION IS TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK OR BASIS FOR WORKING OUT MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES AT SUBSEQUENT SCC SESSIONS.

5. THE BASIC U.S. APPROACH TO THIS SUBJECT IS THAT THESE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE BASED ON:

(A) THE ABM TREATY AND APPLICABLE AGREED STATEMENTS;

(B) THE PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974;

(C) THE AGREED GUIDELINES CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS OF JULY 3, 1974.

6. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE GENERAL APPROACHES TO WORKING OUT THESE PROCEDURES, TODAY I WILL OUTLINE SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OR CRITERIA WHICH THE U.S. SIDE CONSIDERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AT SUBSEQUENT SCC SESSIONS:

(-) THE PROCEDURES MUST ENSURE THAT THE LIMITS OF THE ABM TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL ARE NOT EXCEEDED DURING THE REPLACEMENT PROCESS AS A RESULT OF OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES.

(B) THE PROCEDURES MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY REPLACEMENT PROGRAM, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.

(C) THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE MUST NOT BE DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROCEDURES.

(D) REPLACEMENT AND DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES MUST BE WORKED OUT BOTH FOR CURRENT ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND FOR
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THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS. HOWEVER, THE PROCEDURES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE SAME FOR BOTH SITUATIONS.

(E) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURES MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

(F) THE PROCEDURES MUST PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION.

III

7. IN OUR VIEW, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF INCLUDING THIS ITEM ON OUR AGENDA IS TO HAVE A DIRECT AND FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE GENERAL APPROACHES TO AND THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR WORKING OUT THE MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT OF OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS

AND THEIR COMPONENTS AT SUBSEQUENT SCC SESSIONS.

8. THE U.S. COMPONENT OF THE SCC IS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH THIS WORK IN MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, IN ANY COMPOSITION, AND AT WHATEVER PACE WE BOTH FIND MOST EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. IT IS RECOGNIZED, THAT DURING THIS SESSION, AS BEFORE, EITHER SIDE MAY ALSO RAISE ANY OTHER MATTER WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SCC'S RESPONSIBILITIES.

IV

9. MR. COMMISSIONER, THE SCC HAS PROVEN ITS CAPABILITIES. IT HAS DEVELOPED A SOUND FOUNDATION FOR PROCEEDING WITH WORK WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. IN MY OPINION, IT HAS CONTRIBUTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT COULD ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THE U.S. COMPONENT LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTINUED EFFECTIVE WORK WITH THE SOVIET SCC COMPONENT.

UNQUOTE

GRAYBEAL

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